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[S. F. No. 18366. In Bank. Mar. 25, 1952.] 
STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND et al., 
Petitioners, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS-
SION, PAUL J. HULL, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation-Compensable Injuries-Injuries In-
flicted by Foreman.-An employee who was injured in a fight 
with his foreman in which he was the aggressor and which 
occurred during the course of the employment is entitled to 
workmen's compensation for such injuries. (Disapproving, 
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 470 
[225 P. 273] and Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
2 Cal.2d 8 [37 P.2d 1039].) 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for personal injuries. 
A ward affirmed. 
Donald Gallagher and Royle A. Carter for Petitioners. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., T. Groezinger, Robert Ball, P. H. 
McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara, Herbert S. Johnson and 
Alfred C. Skaife for Respondents. 
CARTER, J.-Compensation was awarded to Paul J. Hull 
under the workmen's compensation law. The employer and 
his insurance carrier seek to have the award annulled. 
Hull was employed as an oiler on road construction work 
west of Woodland, California. He had been working about 
three and a half days with an outfit of which William Hoover 
was foreman. While they were at work Hoover walked past 
Hull to a truck driver and directed the latter to tell Hull to 
help load a caterpillar. Hull received confirmation of the 
order by calling across to Hoover. Later Hull approached 
Hoover and inquired why he didn't give him a direct order 
instead of relaying it through the truck driver. Hoover 
asked, "What's the matter, don't you like your job?" Hull 
said he didn't mind the job, but he wanted to be talked to as 
man to man. Asked if he wanted to quit, Hull said he did 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation,§ 80; Am.Jur., Work-
men's Compensation, § 266. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 95. 
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not, but thought ''it was a ~ ' to give an order after~ 
walking past him face to face. According to Hoover, Hull 
called him a bad name. Hoover told him he'd better take 
off his glasses if he was going to talk like that, to which Hull 
replied that he didn't need to remove them, and he "swung" 
at Hoover. He "missed" but a fight ensued in which he was 
hit several times by Hoover. He received injuries which in-
capacitated him for a period of about 10 days and required 
medical treatment and dental work. 
The commission's first order was a denial of compensation 
based on the finding that Hull was the aggressor in the fight. 
A petition for rehearing was granted by the commission to 
reconsider whether Hull was the aggressor and if so, whether 
an aggressor injured in an argument arising out of the 
employment was entitled to an award of compensation under 
the workmen's compensation law of this state. In its order 
on rehearing the commission found that Hull sustained in-
jury occurring in the course of and arising out of the em-
ployment in an altercation in which he was the aggressor. 
An award of $8.57 temporary disability and an additional 
award to cover the cost of medical and dental treatment 
followed. 
The petitioners challenge the validity of the award on the 
ground that it is contrary to the decisions of the Industrial 
Accident Commission from the beginning of operation of the 
governing law in this state and contrary to definite intima-
tions of this court in harmony with the decisions of the corn-
mission. The respondents concede that their present position 
is contrary to former decisions of the commission and of state-
:p:Ients of this court, but they assert that "the modern trend" 
in industrial accident cases is to award compensation "irre-
spective of fault'' and that although an aggressor may be at 
fault he is nevertheless entitled to compensation. 
[1] The workmen's compensation law as declared in the 
Constitution and statutes compels affirmance of the award. 
The Constitution confers upon the Legislature power to 
establish a system of workmen's compensation and create 
and enforce a liability on employers to compensate their 
workmen for injury sustained in the course of their employ-
ment "irrespective of the fwult of any party.'' (Italics 
added.) (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 21.) The only require-
ments of the statute are, that to be compensable, an injury 
must "arise out of" and "occur in the course of" the em-
ployment. (Lab. Code, § 3600.) That is to say the employee 
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must be engaged in some activity growing out of and inci-
dental to his employment at the time he suffers an injury in 
order to be entitled to compensation under the workmen's 
compensation law. It cannot be doubted that a dispute be-
tween an employee and his superior in regard to the latter's 
treatment of the former in their relations as boss and worker 
is incidental to the employment. There is no doubt that the 
injury occurred in the course of the employment, for that 
has reference ordinarily to time and place. Hull has satisfied 
both aspects. The crucial issue is whether it "arose out of" the 
employment, and that poses the question of whether there is 
a causal connection between the employment and the injury. 
That that is the only issue follows from the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act which excludes fault and contributory negli-
gence of the employee and assumption of risk as defenses. 
That is the express declaration of the Constitution and stat-
utes relating to workmen's compensation. Indeed the statute 
compels that result inasmuch as it declares that "serious 
and wilful misconduct'' on the part of the employee does not 
defeat his recovery; it merely cuts it in half, and not even 
that under certain conditions (Lab. Code, § 4551), thus indi-
cating clearly that misconduct on his part is not a defense. 
Hence the charge of aggressor cannot be a defense, for it is 
nothing more than an assertion that the employee was at fault 
-was to blame-brought it on himself. 
These principles, including the negation of a requirement 
that the employee is doing something for his employer's bene-
fit, were clearly stated by this court in the recent case of 
Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 
[158 P.2d 9, 159 A.L.R. 313], where we abandoned the long 
standing rule in this state that the victim of "horseplay" was 
not entitled to compensation. The logic of that case is here 
compelling. We said: "As grounds for annulling the award, 
the insurer contends that, although the applicant's injury 
occurred in the course of her employment, it did not arise 
'out of' her employment and, accordingly, is not a compen-
sable injury within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident 
Commission. . . . 'It is not indispensable to recovery, how-
ever, that the employee be rendering a service to Ms employer 
at the time of the in.ft[ry. [Citations.] The essential pre-
requisite to compensation is that danger from which the in-
.inry results be one to which he is exposed as an employee in 
his particular employment.' , , . The petitioner concedes 
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that if skylarking was customary and condoned by the em-
ployer . . . or if, under similar circumstances, Miss Carmel 
had been injured through an altercation between fellow em-
ployees over their work ... she would be entitled to com-
pensation. These judicial distinctions lack realism. . . . Cer-
tainly, a classification of assattlts and altercations as incidental 
to employment, bttt placing accidents caused by playfulness 
and frolicking, in which the injured employee took no part 
and of which he had no knowledge, in the category of those 
not 'proximately caused by the employment,' has no sound 
basis in law or in fact. . . . Considering, as we may, the 
propensities and tendencies of mankind and the ordinary 
habits of life, it must be admitted that wherever human 
beings congregate, either at work or at play, there is some 
frolicking and horseplay. Accordingly, an injury sustained 
by a nonparticipating employee through the horseplay of 
fellow workers arises 'out of' and 'is proximately caused by 
the employment' within the meaning of section 3600 of the 
Labor Code." (Italics added.) More recently this court 
dealt with the question of whether on the basis of respondeat 
superior an employer was liable for an assault by his employee 
on another workman, although he was the aggressor. In Carr 
v. Wm. C. C1·owell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652 [171 P.2d 5], the em-
ployee, following a dispute over work, threw a hammer and 
struck plaintiff with it. Plaintiff was another workman but 
not for the same employer. It was held that the assault was 
in the course of the employment, for it arose out of a dispute 
about the work being performed. We said: "Defendant con-
tends that Enloe was not acting in the scope of his employ-
ment when he injured plaintiff, on the grounds that the throw-
ing of the hammer did not further defendant's interests as 
an employer and that Enloe could not have intended by his 
conduct to further such interests. It is sufficient, however, if 
the injtlry resulted from a dispute arising out of the employ-
ment. Under the provisions of section 2338 of the Civil Code 
a principal is liable for 'wrongful acts' of his agent committed 
'in and as a part of' the principal's business. 'It is not 
necessary that the assault should have been made "as a means, 
or for the purpose of performing the work he (the employee) 
was employed to do." ' ... Such associations 'include the 
faults and derelictions of human beings as well as their vir-
tues and obediences. Men do not discard their personal quali-
ties when they go to work. Into the job they carry their in-
telligence, skill, habits o~ care and rectitude. Just as inevi-
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tably they take along also their tendencies to carelessness 
and camaraderie, as well as emotional make-up. In bringing 
men together, work brings these qualities together, causes 
frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into care-
lessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up. Work 
could not go on if men became automatons repressed in every 
natural expression. . . . These expressions of human nature 
are incidents inseparable from working together. They in-
volve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the, work-
ing environment.' (Hartford Ace. & Indern. Co. v. Cardillo, 
72 App.D.C. 52 [112 F.2d 11, 15] .) " (Italics added.) Cer-
tainly if for the purposes of respondeat superior an employee 
is acting within the scope of his employment when commit-
ting an assault arising from a dispute as to his work because 
it is incidental to employment, it must follow that an injury 
he sustains while committing the assault is also within the 
course of his employment and incidental to it and compensable, 
especially when we remember that the workmen's compen-
sation laws must be liberally construed in favor of the em-
ployee. (Lab. Code, § 3202.) The Carr case was followed by 
Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834 [180 P.2d 684, 172 A.L.R. 
525], where the employer was held liable for an assault by 
his truck driver employee resulting from an altercation fol-
lowing a collision. We held the assault to be in the scope 
of the employment. 
It should be noted that in the Carr case the court cited and 
quoted with approval from Hartford Ace. & Indern Co. v. 
Cardillo, 72 App.D.C. 52 [112 F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S. 
649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 1415] (see portion of Carr case 
last quoted above). The Hartford case was written by Judge 
Rutledge, later an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, and involved the issue of whether an em-
ployee who was assaulted because of vile language he used 
arising out of a work dispute could recover workmen's com-
pensation under the Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act. The court in an illuminating discussion 
held he could, stating: "No common denominator for the cases 
can be found in the nature of the specific act or event which 
is the immediate cause of the injury. Whether it is 'natural' 
or abnormal, occurs on or off the employer's premises, con-
sists in the action of physical or human agencies and, if the 
latter, is reflex or volitional, lawful or unlawful, by one de-
ranged or responsible, the common element is to be found in 
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a broader and more fundamental principle. It is stated by 
Cardozo, J., in Leonbruno v. Champlain Si[k Mills (1920), 
229 N.Y. 4 70 [128 N.E. 711, 13 A.L.R. 522], as follows: 'The 
claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a factory, 
but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and 
conditions inseparable from factory life.' Not the particular 
or peculiar character of the associations and conditions, but 
that the work creates and surrounds the employee with them 
is the basic thing. 
"Nor is it necessary, as these cases show, that the particular 
act or event which is the immediate cause of the injury be 
itself a part of any work done for the employer by the claim-
ant or others. Otherwise no award could be given for many 
injuries now compensated, such as those caused by stray bul-
lets, unexplained falls, objects falling from outside the em-
ployer's premises and work, many street risks, horseplay, most 
assaults and many other causes. 'The risks of injury incurred 
in the crowded contacts of the factory through the acts of 
fellow workmen are not measured by the tendency of such 
acts to serve the master's business.' Not that the act is in the 
line of duty, or forwards the work, or creates special risk, 
but that the work brings the employee within its peril makes 
it, for purposes of compensation, 'part of the work.' 
''Recognition that this is so came more easily as to physical 
than as to human forces. As with street risks, the early dis-
position in cases of human action was to emphasize the par-
ticular act and its nature, except anomalously when it in-
volved merely negligence of the claimant or fellow employees. 
The statutory abolition of common law defenses made easy 
recognition of the accidental character of negligent acts by 
the claimant and fellow servants. The extension to their 
accidental (i.e., non-culpable, but injurious) behavior was 
not difficult. So with that of strangers, including assault by 
deranged persons, and their negligence intruding into the 
working environment. But these extensions required a shift 
in the emphasis from the particular act and its tendency to 
forward the work to its part as a factor in the general work-
ing environment. The shift involved recognition that the 
environment includes associations as well as conditions, and 
that associations include the faults and derelictions of human 
beings as well as their virtues and obediences. Men do not 
discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into 
the job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and 
rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their ten-
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dencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional 
make-up. In bring,ing rnen togethe1·, work brings these quali-
ties together, causes {rict1:ons between thern, creates occasions 
for lapses into carelessness, and fm· fun-making and emotional 
flare-up. Work could not go on if men became automatons 
repressed in every natural expression. 'Old Man River' is a 
part of loading steamboats. 'I'hese expressions of human 
nature are incidents inseparable from working together. They 
involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the 
working environment. 
"But resistance to application of the broad and basic prin-
ciple has been most obstinate perhaps where the particular 
act immediately causing injury involves responsible volition 
by the claimant or others. The extreme instances are those 
containing an element of illegality or criminality. The horse-
play and assault cases are illustrative. Confusion and conflict 
still reign in these realms. 
''Several factors have sustained the resistance. One is the 
hangover from common law conceptions of profiting by one's 
own wrong. But this applies as well, in logic, to contributory 
or one's own exclusive negligence. Another was the now 
thoroughly dissipated notion that voluntary responsible ac-
tion cannot be accidental. The volitional character of the 
act also raised a supposed analogy to 'independent, interven-
ing agency' in tort causation. There was, further, an as-
sumed essential opposition between 'personal' acts and those 
of an 'official' (i.e., related to the work) character. An as-
sault necessarily involves emotional make-up and disturbance. 
In a broad sense nothing is more personal. Quarreling is 
always so. This accounts for the early disposition to regard 
all injuries from wilful assault as not compensable, a view 
also necessarily dictated, except rarely when duty requires 
fighting, if tendency of the particular act to forward the 
work or direct connection with line of duty are the tests of 
liability. But that view now is repudiated nniversally in 
recognition that work causes quarrels and :fights. That they 
involve volition and fault, have no tendency to forward the 
work, and are per·rneated with the personal element of anger 
no longer suffices to break the causal connect?:on between work 
and injury. Emotional disturbance is not of itself an 'inde-
pendent, intervening cause' or a 'departure from the work.' 
''But differences remain as to when work causes quarrels. 
So long as the claimant is merely the victim, not a participant, 
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it makes little difference whether the fighting is by fellow 
employees or strangers to the work or what is the immediate 
occasion for the dispute. The same is true in horseplay. It 
is sufficient that the work brings the claimant within the range 
of peril by requiring his presence there when it strikes. But 
conflict becomes acute when the claimant participates. There 
are two lines of division, which partially overlap. One is 
concerned with whether the claimant is the aggressor. An-
other turns on whether the dispute arises immediately over 
the work or about something else. One view limits compen-
sable causation to quarrels relating directly to the work. It 
disconnects the precipitating incident from the working en-
vironment, though that alone may have produced it. So iso-
lated, its immediate relevance to the work becomes the deter-
minative consideration. Momentary lapses from duty, as in 
horseplay, kidding and teasing, which often explode into 
bursts of temper and fighting become 'departures from the 
work,' 'independent, intervening causes' or 'purely personal 
matters.' Their immediate irrelevance overcomes and nulli-
fies the part played by the work in bringing the men to~ 
gether and creating the occasion for the lapse or outburst. 
The other view rejects the test of immediate relevancy of the 
culminating incident. That is regarded, not as an isolated 
event, but as part and parcel of the working environment, 
whether related directly to the job or to something which is 
a by-product of the association. This view recognizes that 
work places men under strains and fatigue from human and 
mechanical impacts, creating frictions which explode in myr-
iads of ways, only some of which are immediately relevant 
to their tasks. Personal animosities are created by working 
together on the assembly or in traffic. Others initiated out-
side the job are magnified to the breaking point by its com-
pelled contacts. No worker is immune to these pressures 
and impacts upon temperament. They accumulate and ex-
plode over incidents trivial and important, personal and offi-
cial. But the explosion point is merely the culmination of the 
antecedent pressures. That it is not relevant to the imme-
diate task, involves a lapse from duty, or contains an element 
of volition or illegality does not disconnect it from them nor 
nullify their causal effect 1:n producing its injttrious conse-
quences. Any other view wmtld reintrodtwe the conceptions of 
contributory fattlt, action in the line of duty, nonaccidental 
character of voltmtary conduct, and independent, intervening 
cause as applied in tort law, which it was the purpose of the 
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statute to d!iscard. It would require the application of differ-
ent basic tests of liability for injuries caused by volitional 
conduct of the claimant and those resulting from negligent 
action, mechanical causes and the volitional activities of 
others. 
''The limitation, of course, is that the accumulated pressures 
must be attributable in substantial part to the working en-
vironment. '-l'his implies that their causal effect shall not be 
overpowered and nullified by influences originating entirely 
outside the working relation and not substantially magnified 
by it. Whether such influences have annulling effect upon 
those of the environment ordinarily is the crucial issue. The 
difference generally is as to the applicable standard. It is 
not, as is frequently assumed, the law of 'independent, inter-
vening agency' applied in tort cases. It cannot be prescribed 
in meticulous detail, but is set forth in the statute, not only 
in the broad presumptions created in favor of compensability, 
but more explicitly in the provision by which Congress has 
expressed clearly its intention concerning the kinds of acts 
which bar recovery when done by the claimant. The provi-
sion is: 'No compensation shall be payable if the injury was 
occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the 
willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or 
another.' (Italics supplied.) 
''This provision, reinforced by the statutory presumptions 
and the Act's fundamental policy in departing from fault 
as the basis of liability and of defense, except as specified, is 
inconsistent with any notion that recovery is barred by mis-
conduct which amounts to no more than temporary lapse from 
duty, conduct immediately irrelevant to the job, contribu-
tory negligence, fault, illegality, etc., unless it amounts to the 
kind and degree of misconduct prescribed in definite terms 
by the Act. · It is entirely inconsi,stent with reading into the 
statute the law of tort ca~~sation and defense, where liability 
is predicated on fault and nullified by contributory fault.'' 
(Italics added.) 
The modern trend is in accord. (Stark v. State Ind. Ace. 
Corn., 103 Ore. 80 [204 P. 151] ; St~r.lginski v. Watorbury Roll-
·ing lJilills Co., 124 Conn. 355 [199 A. 653] ; Commissioner of 
Taxation & Finance v. Bronx Hospital, 276 App.Div. 708 
[97 N.Y.S.2d 120]; Dillon's Case, 324 Mass. 102 [85 N.E.2d 
69] ; see cases collected 41 ·m.L.Rev. 354-363; Forty Years of 
American Workmen's Compensation, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, 
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota (1951), 35 Minn.L. 
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Rev. 525~548.) .Many writers on the subject have taken the 
r:a.me position (AssauUs and Horseplay under Workmen's 
Compensation Laws, Samuel B. Horovitz, 41 Ill.L.Rev. 311; 
Current Trends in vVorkmen's Compensation, Samuel B. Horo-
vitz (1947), p. 532.) In the above writings .Mr. Horovitz ably 
presents the problem. At page 343 et seq. of 41 Ill.L.Rev. he 
says : ''Why should it make any legal difference under the 
compensation law whether the injured party was the ag-
gressor? Certainly, no compensation statute expressly gives 
the employer the defense of 'aggressor.' 
''Is there some good reason why so many courts, without 
knowing exactly why they do it, deny recovery to all types of 
aggressors~ Where the aggression is deliberate and by mur-
derous means, the reason is apparent. Assume that a quarrel 
starts on .Monday over work tools. Tuesday one employee, 
still angered over that argument, steals up on the other and 
attempts to kill him with a hatchet, and instead trips and in-
jures himself, or is killed by the intended victim in self-de-
fense. The quarrel having its origin in a fight over tools, 
arises out of the employment. 
''If he is to be denied compensation, it must, therefore, be 
on some other ground. .Most acts supply that ground, by 
expressly providing that there shall be no recovery where the 
claimant is guilty of serious and wilful misconduct, or of 
wilful intention to injure or kill himself or another, or similar 
enactments. Certainly a deliberate hatchet-murder, attempted 
the following day when the excuse of high passion is gone, 
falls within the express exception, and no recovery is possible. 
"But no such wilful intention or wilful misconduct can 
be spelled out of every aggressive act. A playful push, an 
angry curse, or even an impulsive punch with a fist is not 
what legislatures intended to punish, by depriving workers of 
compensation. And the burden of proof of such serious and 
wilful misconduct, or wilful intention to injure or any similar 
defense, is upon the employer or insurer. Where the board, 
commission or court does not expressly find such violation, 
what right has the court to read in a new exception for 
'aggressors'? Why rule out negligence, contributory negli-
gence, assumption of risk, etc., in all other types of compensa-
tion cases, and leave it in for assaults~ 
"Wilful misconduct or wilful intention to injure another 
usually denotes premeditated or deliberate misconduct. Seri-
ous and wilful misconduct does not cover misconduct which 
is trivial, no matter how grave the result, or misconduct which 
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is not intentional, e. g., misconduct which is impulsive, or in-
advertent, or thoughtless, or as the result of an instinctive 
act .... 
"Many assaults result from impulsive, thoughtless or unin-
tentional acts, often trivial in origin, although the result 
may be serious or even fatal. The 'explosive point is merely 
the culmination of antecedent pressures' in many instances. 
A worker tells his foreman he wishes to quit the gang and 
that the foreman is prejudiced against him. One word leads 
to another, and fists fly. To create an artificial rttle that he 
whose fist first made contact is an aggressor (and can never 
recover, even though the first fist did no harm, whereas the 
second fist permanently injured the fellow worker), is to 
forget the legislative cornmand that injuries arising out of 
the employment be compensated, short of wilful misconduct 
or similar provisions. And where the quarrel had its origin 
in the work or work-environment and was short of wilful 
misconduct, or short of any express defense in the act, how 
can the court justify their own judicially-created defenses? 
How are they justified in bringing into the compensation 
act the discarded principles of the common law as to contribu-
tory fault, independent intervening cause, and the like~ That 
these tort theories have been discarded is too well recognized 
for further modern argument. That there is a natural re-
pugnancy to help a guilty party is no excuse for relieving 
industry of a liability and placing it on the worker or charity. 
"The moment courts properly admit that, for the non-
aggressor, an assault, malicious or sportive, arises out of the 
employment, that the same assault necessarily arises out of the 
ernployment for the aggressor. It is the characte1· and nature 
of the assault which determines whether it arises out of the 
employment, not the culpability or lack of culpability of the 
parties involved. It is the assault itself which arises out of 
the employment). and who initiates the altercation has no 
bearing on that question, relates to common law culpability 
eonsioerations. and is of importance only in considering the 
leqislative defense of wilful misconduct and the Wee." 
(Italics added.) · 
Mr. William R. Schneider, in analyzing the cases states that 
the weight of authority supports the propositions that (1) as-
saults arising out of controversies over the manner and method 
of performing work are compensable as a general proposition, 
but may not be if the injured employee initiated the assault. 
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(2) Those arising from personal animosity are not. (3) the 
aggressor in the assault may not recover. (Schneider, Work-
men's Compensation rrext [Perm. ed.] § 1560.) There is no 
basis for distinguishing between the case where the employee 
initiated the assault and where he did not or that of an ag-
gressor and nonaggressor, except in one the employee is at 
fault and in the other he is not. As seen, this cannot be a valid 
distinction, because the fault of the employee is no bar to 
recovery unless it is serious and wilful misconduct and then 
only to the extent of one half the compensation, and not at 
all if the employee is killed, suffers 70 per cent or more disa-
bility, was under 16 years of age, or the employer failed to 
comply with a safety regulation. (Lab. Code, § 4551.) 
The contention is made that considerations· of public policy 
require that recovery be denied in cases where the employee 
is injured while engaged in the violation of a penal statute, 
because, to allow recovery in such a case, would permit a per-
son to benefit by his own wrong. That appears to be the real 
basis of many of the decisions denying recovery. The effect 
of such a holding is to deny recovery because of the fault of 
the employee contrary to the express provisions of the Con-
stitution and statutes relating to workmen's compensation. 
The question of policy is for the people and the Legislature 
in the first instance and here they have spoken in no uncer-
tain language, saying that fault, serious and wilful miscon-
duct, and contributory negligence do not bar recovery. Hence 
to the extent such action by the employee is within a "wrong" 
by which he may not ordinarily benefit, the policy declared is 
that he may so benefit. 
In the same connection, fear has been expressed that work-
men will receive compensation for injuries suffered while 
committing a serious crime and who may be imprisoned for 
the offense. This fear is unfounded. Situations are conceiv-
able where all would probably agree that compensation should 
be awarded even though a crinie was committed. Take the 
case where an employee is injured while driving a car with 
defective brakes or without lights at night while engaged in 
conducting his employer's business or is required to make fast 
deliveries and so operates it that he is guilty of speeding, 
reckless driving, or even manslaughter. There may be cases 
in which a crime (e. g., murder) is committed where the crimi-
nal act may not be said to be reasonably related to the em-
ployment-is not within the realm of those acts which may 
arise out of emotional conflicts engendered by frictions in 
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employment. When such a case is presented it can be decided 
on its facts without violating sound rules of construction of 
the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to work-
men's compensation. Rather than attempt to state a general 
rule with exact boundaries, the court should meet each case 
as it arises. Clearly, a simple assault, such as here involved 
is not outside the boundary or in the category of an act hav-
ing no reasonable connection with the employment. 
The dictum contrary to the foregoing in Globe Indemnity 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 470 [225 P. 273] and 
Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 2 Ca1.2d 8 [37 
P.2d 1039], is disapproved. 
The award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., concurred in the judgment. 
SHENK, J.-1 dissent. The crucial issue is conceded to be 
whether the injury "arose out of" the employment. The 
majority assumes to settle the question by the observation that 
the Constitution declares that injury so sustained shall be 
deemed compensable" irrespective of the fault of any party"; 
that since aggression is fault, it is therefore not a defense. 
This oversimplified solution is contrary to established state 
policy and decisional law. 
The holding in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 26 Cal.2d 286 [158 P.2d 9, 159 .A.L.R. 313], does not 
sustain the proposition. As the majority opinion points out, 
the court there abandoned the long existing rule that the non-
participating "victim" of horseplay was not entitled to com-
pensation. Here we are dealing with the aggressor, not his 
victim. Nor is reference to the result under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior in point. There again the injuries to 
another person are involved. In my opinion the words "with-
out the fault of any party" apply, as the Constitution indi-
cates, after it is determined that the injury arises out of the 
employment. .As the opinion concedes, an aggressive act has 
not uniformly been deemed to be an act coupled with and 
therefore arising out of employment. On the contrary the 
weight of authority has supported and still supports the view 
that an aggressor has stepped aside from his employment and 
at least as to his own injuries is not within the purview of the 
compensation acts. 
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It is true that the salutary provisions of workmen's com-
pensation laws in this state and elsewhere generally have 
abolished the rule of assumption of risk, the fellow servant 
doctrine and contributory negligence as defenses in proceed-
ings in behalf of an injured workman. But it does not follow 
that all other defenses have been abolished. 
Regardless of the seemingly broad and all-inclusive lan-
guage of our constitutional provision as an enabling act, 
it has always been recognized that certain facts must be es-
tablished and conditions found to exist before the compen-
sation law may be invoked. It is essential that the relationship 
of employer and employee be present at the time of the injury. 
It is also essential that the injuries must have been sustained 
by the worlnn.en ''in the course of their employment.'' 
( Const., art. XX, § 21.) In the exercise of its plenary power 
the Legislature has imposed other conditions on the right 
of an employee to receive compensation from his employer. 
Section 3600 of the Labor Code requires (a) that both the 
employer and the employee be subject to the compensation 
provisions of the code; (b) that, at the time of the injury, 
the employee be performing services growing out of and in-
cidental to his employment and be acting within the course 
of his employment; (c) that the injury be proximately caused 
by the employment, either with or without negligence; (d) 
that the injury be not caused by the intoxication of the in-
jured employee; or (e) that the injury be not intentionally 
self-inflicted. 
The incidents of employment relationship and "course of 
employment" requirements of subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) 
cannot be seriously questioned; and the prohibitions against 
compensation, notwithstanding the concurrence of all other 
requirements, contained in subdivisions (d) and (e) have 
never been successfully attacked. 
Furthermore section 4551 of the Labor Code denies com-
pensation as to one half where the employee is guilty of seri-
ous and wilful misconduct. 
No one may rightfully question the power of the Legis-
lature to place proper restrictions on the right to compensa-
tion subject of course to the constitutional provisions. Whether 
an ''aggressor'' should be entitled to compensation and the 
extent if any to which he may be so entitled is a question 
of public policy, a subject on which the Legislature might 
well provide appropriate regulations. The fact that it has 
not done so may be accounted for by the fact that in the 
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history of the interpretation of the applicable law in this 
state both by decisions of the commission and by language of 
this court, the rule has invariably been to deny compensation 
to the "aggressor" in assault cases. 
In view of that history, interpretation and long standing 
public policy, it is not the province of this court to lay down 
a rule that an aggressor should be entitled to compensation 
under any and all circumstances. The offense might be of 
such a nature as to exclude the conduct of the aggressor-
employee from consideration as action within the course of 
his employment. Such conduct might be in violation of some 
penal law of the state involving conduct malttm in se and of 
the most flagrant nature. It might even result in murder. 
In such a case, if the commission's position be sustained, the 
perpetrator of the crime could be receiving compensation 
while confined in state's prison for the offense. Liberal con-
struction of compensation laws should not go the length now 
established by the majority decision as the policy of the state 
that an aggressor should receive compensation benefits. It 
certainly should not be the rule that an employee committing 
a criminal assault on another should be deemed to be acting 
for his employer for the purpose of collecting from him com-
pensation for injuries which he sustained as a result of his 
own criminal act. Whether the aggressor-employee's conduct 
would constitute such a penal offense as to entitle him to or 
exclude him from compensation should be determined in 
accordance with some legislative guide. If the acts of the 
aggressor-employee amount to serious and wilful misconduct 
compensation to the extent of one half may in a proper case 
be awarded as provided by section 4551 of the Labor Code. 
But it has never been held that regardless of the seriousness 
of the offense, the offender is entitled to compensation-one 
half or at all. 
The decisions of the commission which have denied com-
pensation to the aggressor, with the sole exception of the order 
on rehearing in this proceeding, include the following: Hemp-
hill v. Industrial Ace. Com., 20 I.A.C. 110; Sosson v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., 17 LA. C. 120; Turner v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
17 I.A.O. 119; McGttirk v. Frank J. Klimm Co., 17 I.A.O. 12; 
Wilson v. Carter, 14 I.A.O. 78; Challman v. State Harbor 
Commrs., 9 0.0.0. 120; Galpin v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
2 0.0.0. 29. 
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Although an aggressor was not directly involved in Giobe 
Indemnity Co. v. Ind~tstriai Ace. Corn., 193 Cal. 470 [225 P. 
273], and Wobe Indemnity Co. v. IndustTiai Ace. Com., 2 Cal. 
2d 8 [37 P.2d 1039], the rule of noncompensability for in-
juries on behalf of an aggressor established and uniformly 
adhered to by the commission was not questioned and was 
approved by implication. 
Numerous authorities elsewhere disclose the prevailing view 
to be that a claimant who is the aggressor in an assault 
steps aside from his employment for a purpose of his own 
even though the argument which precipitates the assault is 
work-incited. Such cases follow the general rule (see note, 
112 A.L.R. at page 1270 with citation of cases), that where 
the claimant is the aggressor in provoking an assault upon 
himself, the injury does not arise out of the employment. 
(Vollmer v. City of Milwaukee (1948), 254 Wis. 162 [35 N.W. 
2d 304] ; Riley v. I ndustTial 0 orn. ( 1946) , 394 Ill. 126 [ 67 
N.E.2d 172]; KimbTo v. Black & White Cab Co. (1934), 50 
Ga.App. 143 [177 S.E. 274]; Merkel v. T. A. Gillespie Co. 
(1932), 10 N.J.Misc. 1081 [162 A. 250]; Davis v. Robinson, 
(1932), 94 Ind.App. 104 [179 N.E. 797, 799-800]; TTiangle 
Auto P. & T. Co. v. IndustTial Com. (1931), 346 Ill. 609 [178 
N.E. 886] ; cf. Horvath v. LaFond (1943), 305 Mich. 69 
[8 N.W.2d 915]; Williams v. Industrial Com. (1939), 63 
Ohio App. 66 [25 N.E.2d 313] ; CheTry v. Magnolia Pet. Co. 
(Tex.Com.App. 1932), 45 S.W.2d 555; Fttlton Bag & Cotton 
Mills v. Haynie (1931), 43 Ga.App. 579 [159 S.E. 781]; Mar-
tin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. (1927), 216 Ala. 500 
[113 So. 578]; OuTran v. Vang Canst. Co. (1926), 286 Pa. 
245 [133 A. 261]; Stillwagon v. Callan BTos. Inc. (1918), 
183 App.Div. 141 [170 N.Y.S. 677]; Griffin v. A. Roberson 
& Son (1916), 176 App.Div. 6 [162 N.Y.S. 313, 314] .) Carr 
v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal.2d 652 [171 P.2d 5], Fields v. 
Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834 [180 P.2d 684, 172 A.L.R. 525], and 
similar cases are consistent with that general rule. Those 
cases involve the right of third parties to recover from an 
aggressor's employer for injuries inflicted by the aggressor 
while acting in the course of his employment. (Of. Hartford 
Ace. & Indem. Co. v. CaTdillo (1940), 72 App.D.C. 52 [112 
F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S. 649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 
1415] .) In those cases it was not the aggressor-employee who 
was seeking recovery of benefits for injuries which he re-
ceived. Such cases are not in point and should not be con-
sidered to have controlling effect here. 
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Cases which are said to indicate a "modern trend" to com-
pensate the aggressor for his injuries are conceded in the 
majority opinion not to be in accord with the weight of au-
thority. (See Schueller v. Armour & Co. (1935), 116 Pa. 
Super. 323, 328 [176 A. 527]; Traders & General Ins. Co. v. 
Mills (Tex.Civ.App. 1937), 108 S.W.2d 219, 224; Hartford 
Ace.&; Indem. Co. v. Cardillo (1940), 72 App.D.C. 52 [112 
F.2d 11], cert. den. 310 U.S. 649 [60 S.Ct. 1100, 84 L.Ed. 
1415]; Newell v. Moreau (1947), 94 N.H. 439 [55 A.2d 476, 
479-480]; Dillon's Case (1949), 324 Mass. 102 [85 N.E.2d 69, 
72] ; Commissioner of Tax. & Fin. v. Bronx Hospital (1950), 
276 App.Div. 708 [97 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122-123] ; cf. Stulginski 
v. Waterbury Rolling Mills Co. (1938), 124 Conn. 355 [199 A. 
653] ; Haas v. B1·otherhood of Trans. Workers ( 1945), 158 
Pa.Super. 291 [ 44 A.2d 776, 780] ; see cases collected Horo-
vitz article, 41 Ill. Law Rev. 311, at p. 363, n. 170.) The 
applicable rule must necessarily depend on the law of the 
forum. 
Because this court in Pacific Emp. Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Com., supra, 26 Cal.2d 286, overruled numerous earlier 
cases which denied compensation to a nonparticipating em-
ployee injured through the horseplay of a fellow worker is 
no reason now to disclaim adherence to the cases in this state 
which have impliedly approved the general rule heretofore 
followed by the commission in aggressor assault cases. The 
decision in that case may properly lead to a holding of com-
pensability for injuries suffered by the victim of the aggressor; 
but it is not authority for compensating the self-provoked in-
juries of an aggressor. The risk that an employee may receive 
injuries from his own act of aggression should not be consid-
ered incidental to his employment. If the rule as heretofore 
established in this state is to be relaxed and recovery be au-
thorized under circumstances which do not otherwise offend 
the law, the change should be made by the Legislature, not by 
the courts. In my opinion the award should be annulled. 
Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
